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GROVE CITY COLLEGE v. BELL: A PROPOSAL TO
OVERTURN THE SUPREME COURT'S NARROW
CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE IX'S SEX
DISCRIMINATION
PROHIBITION
I. INTRODUCTION
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers
of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encour-
ages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in ... discrimination I
In 1972, eighteen years after enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 Congress reaffirmed the federal government's commitment to end-
ing discrimination by enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. 3 Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educa-
tion programs and provides that federal agencies extending aid may ter-
minate funding upon a finding of discrimination.4
Title IX has proven an effective tool for ending discrimination.5 The
Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell,6 however, nar-
rowed the scope of Title IX's coverage. Although legislation has been
introduced to overrule the case,7 Congress' failure to act on the bills
raises questions about the ability of federal agencies to continue to com-
bat discrimination.'
This Note examines the Grove City College decision and its impact
on efforts to end sex discrimination in education. It also discusses legis-
lation proposed in Congress to overturn the decision. Finally, the Note
1. 109 CONG. REC. Si1,161 (1963) (Pres. Kennedy's message to Congress).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4
(1982)).
3. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1982)).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1982).
5. 130 CONG. Rac. S4585-86 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
6. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
7. The Civil Rights Act of 1984, S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S4585-88
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984), passed the House overwhelmingly on June 26, 1984. 130 CONG.
REc. H7017-18 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). The Senate, however, failed to vote on the measure,
and tabled the bill on October 2, 1984. 130 CONG. REc. S12,642 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984). For
a discussion of the fate of the Civil Rights Act of 1984, see infra notes 145-53 and accompany-
ing text.
8. 130 CONG. REc. S4585-87 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:235
proposes new legislation consistent with the federal government's broad
policy against discrimination.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Grove City College v. Bell,9 the Supreme Court interpreted the
program-specific language of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.10 Section 901(a) thereof provides that: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.""1
Grove City College is a private, coeducational institution which re-
ceives no direct federal financial assistance.12 Large numbers of its stu-
dents, however, receive Pell grants 3 and Guaranteed Student Loans
(GSL's) 4 from the Department of Education. 5 The Department con-
tended that such aid made Grove City College a recipient of federal fi-
nancial assistance and therefore subject to the anti-discrimination
requirements of section 901(a).16 Accordingly, it requested that the Col-
lege execute an Assurance of Compliance17 with Title IX as required
under the Department's Title IX regulations." The College refused to
execute an Assurance, arguing that since it received no direct federal aid,
it was not required to comply with Title IX.19
A. The Administrative Proceedings
The Department responded by initiating proceedings pursuant to its
9. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
10. Id at 1220-22.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
12. 104 S. Ct. at 1214.
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (1982) (formerly Basic Educational Opportunity Grants
(BEOG's)). Section 1070(a) authorizes the Department of Education to award grants to col-
lege students based on need. Id
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982). Section 1071 authorizes the Department of Education to
set up a program of federal loan insurance for lenders and interest subsidies to students for
education loans. Id.
15. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1214-15. The Department of Education, formerly the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, administers federal education aid and is re-
sponsible for enforcing Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
16. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1215.
17. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1982).
18. Section 902 of Title IX authorizes federal agencies extending federal financial assist-
ance for education to promulgate regulations to ensure compliance with Title IX. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1682 (1982).
19. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 255 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd sub no.
Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
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authority under section 902 of Title IX to declare the College and its
students ineligible to receive Pell grants and student loans.20 Section 902
provides that federal assistance may be terminated for failure to comply
with Department regulations implementing Title IX after notice and op-
portunity for a hearing.2'
At the hearing, the administrative law judge found that Grove City
College had failed to comply with Department regulations requiring exe-
cution of an Assurance and ordered that the loans and grants be termi-
nated.22 The judge refused to consider Grove City's challenge to the
validity of the regulation, holding that such a question was beyond the
scope of his authority.23
B. The District Court Decision
Grove City College and four of its students sought judicial review of
the decision in the district court, claiming, inter alia, that the Depart-
ment had exceeded its authority under section 901(a) of Title IX in find-
ing that the College was a recipient of federal financial assistance.24 The
district court held that while the students' Pell grants and GSL's25 made
the College a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning
of the statute, the aid could be terminated only upon a finding of actual
discrimination.26
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Department need not
20. Id.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
22. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. at 255-56.
23. Id at 255.
24. Id at 256-57.
25. The district court held that while Guaranteed Student Loans do constitute federal
financial assistance, they cannot subject a recipient institution to Title IX. Id at 268. Section
902 of Title IX empowers federal agencies extending financial assistance to students to termi-
nate such assistance for failure to comply with Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). Contracts
of insurance or guaranty are excluded from the types of aid which may be terminated. Id The
district court held that GSL's are contracts of insurance or guaranty. Grove City College v.
Harris, 500 F. Supp. at 268.
26. Grove City College, 500 F. Supp. at 272. The district court also held that because
Subpart E of the Department's Title IX regulations was invalid, the Department could not
require the College to execute an Assurance. Subpart E prohibits employment discrimination
and has since been upheld in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). In
addition to holding that termination was permitted only upon a finding of actual discrimina-
tion, the court found that affected students were entitled to a hearing before their aid could be
discontinued. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1216 n.9. The court of appeals
rejected this reasoning. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 704 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104
S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
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make a finding of actual discrimination before terminating funds for fail-
ure to execute an Assurance of Compliance.27 The court agreed with the
Department and the district court that student loans and grants, without
more, made Grove City College a recipient of federal financial assistance
subject to Title IX coverage.28 However, in response to Grove City's
contention that even if it did receive federal financial assistance, section
901(a)'s program-specific language precluded the Department from re-
quiring the entire institution to comply, the court noted that "[w]here the
federal government furnishes indirect or non-earmarked aid to an institu-
tion,... the institution itself must be the 'program'. ' 29 The court there-
fore upheld the Department's order terminating funds to Grove City
College.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The meaning of "receiving federal financial assistance"
In affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court first rejected Grove City College's contention that it received no
federal financial assistance within the meaning of section 901(a).30 The
Court found no indication in the language of section 901(a) that Con-
gress intended to distinguish between federal aid paid directly to an insti-
27. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
28. Id at 693. The Supreme Court also agreed that the College was covered by Title IX
because some of its students received federal financial assistance for their education costs. See
infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. According to the Court, Congress intended both
direct aid to a college and funds received through its students to trigger Title IX coverage.
Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (1984).
The Grove City decision on this issue is consistent with a 1974 district court ruling involv-
ing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597
(D.S.C. 1974), af'd mem, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). Bob Jones University is a private,
religiously affiliated school that accepts no direct federal financial assistance. Id. at 599-600.
The University denied admission to unmarried nonwhites and expelled students who dated
outside their own race, consistent with the administration's conviction that racial segregation
is mandated by God. Id at 600.
During 1971-72, 221 students at Bob Jones received approximately $397,800 in Veterans
Administration (VA) educational benefits. The court found that the students' receipt of the VA
benefits subjected the University to Title VI coverage. Id. at 601-02.
The Sixth Circuit found Bob Jones University persuasive when it held that Title IX cov-
ered an institution receiving federal assistance only through its students. Hillsdale College v.
Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418, 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1982). The Hillsdale
court, however, went on to presage Grove City College by holding that only the financial aid
department of the College was subject to Title IX regulation. Id. at 430. See infra notes 36-60
and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
29. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d at 700.
30. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1220 (1984).
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tution and aid which indirectly reaches an institution through payments
to students." In addition, the Court noted that Congress intended stu-
dent assistance programs to benefit colleges and universities.3 2 Finally,
the Court relied on "Title IX's unique post-enactment history."33 The
Court concluded that Congress' failure to disapprove Department regu-
lations defining "recipient"3 4 provided a strong inference "that the regu-
lations accurately reflect congressional intent."35
2. The meaning of "program or activity"
The Supreme Court rejected, however, the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that Grove City College in its entirety was the "program" subject to
the anti-discrimination provisions of section 901(a).36 According to the
Court, the program-specific language of section 901(a) limits Title IX
coverage to the particular program or activity within the college that
received federal financial assistance.37
The Court noted that Pell grants can be administered to students in
two ways.3" Most institutions participate in the Regular Disbursement
System, under which each college receives a lump sum from the Depart-
ment based on an estimate of the college's needs. The institution then
calculates awards and disburses the money to individual students.39
Grove City College, however, participated in the Alternative Dis-
bursment System, designed to minimize the institution's involvement
with the federal government.' ° Under this system, Grove City College
gave information concerning its students' eligibility to the Department.
The Department then calculated and disbursed awards.41
The Court opined that if Grove City College had participated in the
Regular Disbursement System, the Court "would have [had] no doubt
that the 'education program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance'.., would be its student financial aid program."' 2 According to the
31. Id. at 1217.
32. Id. at 1217-18.
33. Id. at 1219. The Court had twice before "recognized the probative value of Title IX's
unique post-enactment history." Id (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
535 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 & n.7 (1979)).
34. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,137 (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1984)).
35. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1219.
36. Id. at 1220.
37. Id
38. Id at 1214-15 & n.5.
39. Id at 1215 n.5.
40. Id at 1214-15 & n.5.
41. Id. at 1215 n.5.
42. Id. at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
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Court, although such institutions receive aid directly from the federal
government, the funds can only be used to expand financial aid.4 3 This
restriction, reasoned the Court, meant that such aid is in fact earmarked
for the financial aid program.' Thus, only that program can be required
to comply with section 901(a) of Title IX. 5
The Court then reasoned that Grove City College's participation in
the Alternative Disbursement System provided the same benefit to its
financial aid program as would result under the Regular Disbursement
System.46 Because the effect under the two systems would be the same,
the Court concluded that Grove City College's financial aid department
must comply with section 901(a). 7
The Court discounted "isolated suggestions" 48 in the legislative his-
tory that Congress intended an entire institution to be subject to Title IX
coverage ff one of its programs received federal financial assistance.49
The Court also rejected the argument that because federal funds freed up
the College's own resources for use in other areas, the entire institution
benefited from the aid. Conceding that federal aid creates such an "eco-
nomic ripple effect" throughout an institution, the majority found section
901(a)'s program-specific language inconsistent with this conclusion.50
The Court also faulted the lower court's analogy between grants and
43. Id. at 1221.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1222.
46. Id. at 1221.
47. Id The Court stated that to conclude that student financial aid funds paid to the
college as tuition constitute aid to the entire college ignores the program-specific language of
§ 901(a). Id at 1221. The Court first rejected the court of appeals argument that because such
aid benefited the entire institution, the institution was the program subject to § 901(a). Ac-
cording to the Court, there was no evidence that Grove City College diverted funds from its
own financial aid program to other areas as a result of federal aid to students. Id. However,
the Court did not consider such lack of evidence to be determinative. Even if federal aid to
students resulted in benefit to the entire institution, the Court concluded that Congress did not
intend to subject the entire College to Title IX coverage. Id.
The court of appeals in effect defined "program" as an entity which benefits from Federal
financial assistance. The Supreme Court rejected this approach without explanation. See infra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
48. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1220.
49. See, eg., SEX DISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 94TH
CONG., 1ST SEss. 178 (1975). Again, the majority gave no explanation for its rejection of the
court of appeals' reading of congressional intent. Nor did the majority either discuss or cite to
Title X's legislative history to support its contrary finding of Congressional intent. Thus, the
rationale for the Court's interpretation of § 901(a)'s program-specific language remains
obscure.
50. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1221.
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loans to students and nonearmarked federal assistance."1 The Third Cir-
cuit reasoned that an institution in its entirety must comply with section
901(a) if it receives nonearmarked grants.52 The court of appeals likened
nonearmarked grants to student financial aid because the student aid
eventually goes into the institution's general operating budget for use in a
variety of programs.53
However, the Supreme Court characterized student financial aid
programs as "sui generis," 4 and concluded that Pell grants are not the
same as unrestricted direct grants to a college.55 The Court conceded
that substantial portions of funds from student aid end up in the institu-
tion's general budget,5 6 but refused to infer that "Congress intended...
the Department's regulatory authority [to] follow federally aided stu-
dents from classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity to
activity."57 Moreover, according to the majority, because student aid in-
creased both an institution's resources and its obligations, it more closely
resembled earmarked federal grants.5"
In summary, the majority refused to require Grove City College to
comply with section 901(a) in its entirety,59 even though it held that the
51. Id.
52. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3d Cir. 1982), aft'd, 104 S. Ct. 1211
(1984). Although the Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' characterization of student
financial aid as nonearmarked, the Court implicitly agreed that, as a general proposition, gen-
eral use aid would subject an entire institution to Title IX coverage. Grove City College, 104 S.
Ct. 1211, 1221-22. See also Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ.,
524 F. Supp. 531, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
53. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d at 700.
54. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1221-22.
55. l
56. Id. at 1222.
57. Id.
58. Id. Although the Court did not explain its statement that student aid increases an
institution's obligations, it may have been referring to the costs of participation in student
financial aid programs. The Court cited to 20 U.S.C. § 1070e, which provides for cost-of-
education payments to institutions of higher education whose students receive Pell grants.
Section 1070e(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) provides that an institution receiving such payments shall "set
forth such policies, assurances, and procedures as will insure that" the funds will be used only
for academic programs, that they will not be used for religious activity and that the recipient
will not decrease its own spending on academic programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1070e(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)
(1982). Although the statute clearly imposes requirements on a recipient institution, it is diffi-
cult to see how this makes student financial aid different from any other type of federal finan-
cial aid. First, the requirements of § 1070e(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) arguably apply only to an
institution which accepts such payments. Although Grove City College students received Pell
grants, the College refused to accept the payments provided for by § 1070e. Thus, it could not
be subject to the requirements of § 1070e(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Second, all federal extensions of
financial assistance contain restrictions and requirements, however general, which attend their
use.
59. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1222. The Court's holding on this issue resolved a
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College received federal financial assistance through loans and grants to
students. The Court's holding that only the College's financial aid de-
partment must comply with section 901(a), however, did not change the
factual result of the lower court's judgment. Because the College and the
financial aid department persisted in refusing to execute an Assurance of
Compliance, the Court upheld the Department's order terminating the
assistance.6
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the Court
that Grove City College received federal financial assistance within the
meaning of section 901(a) because its students received federal grants and
loans.61 He would have held, however, that the entire College must com-
ply with section 901(a), rather than only the financial aid department.62
Justice Brennan charged that the Court's holding ignored congressional
conflict between the circuit courts of appeals. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Common-
wealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982); and Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th
Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court adopted the result reached by the Sixth Circuit in Hillsdale College.
Hillsdale College, 696 F.2d at 430. The Hillsdale court, under facts identical to those in Grove
City College, rejected the Third Circuit's reasoning in Grove City College. Id. at 429-30. Not-
ing that the Third Circuit based its interpretation of Title IX's program-specific language pri-
marily on the statute's post-enactment history, the Sixth Circuit maintained that such broad
coverage would render the language meaningless. Id.
60. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1222-23. The Court rejected Grove City College's
contention that the Assurance of Compliance it refused to sign was invalid. Id. at 1222. Ac-
cording to the Court, the Assurance required only that Grove City College comply with the
applicable requirements of Title IX. Id.
The Court also decided that an actual finding of discrimination was not required before
funds could be terminated under Title IX, and that conditioning the College's eligibility to
participate in the Pell grant program on compliance with Title IX did not infringe upon any
first amendment rights of the College or its students. Id. at 1222-23.
61. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1226 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
62. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor joined, decrying the "overzealousness" of the federal government. Id. at 1223
(Powell, J., concurring). Although Justice Powell agreed that the language and legislative
history dictated the Court's holding that Grove City College was covered by Title IX, id.
(Powell, J., concurring), he pointed out that the record revealed no allegations of discrimina-
tion against the College. Id. at 1224 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell also objected to the fact that if the College refused to execute an Assurance
of Compliance, a termination of funds would force students to change schools or give up their
education. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens refused to join in the Court's holding that only the financial aid depart-
ment was covered by Title IX. Id. at 1225 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). In a short opinion,
Justice Stevens contended first that the Court need not have reached the issue, and second, that
the Court's holding would require a "factual inquiry ... as to which of Grove City's programs
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intent and the broad purpose Title IX was enacted to serve.63
Justice Brennan first turned to the legislative history of Title IX to
determine the meaning of the program-specific language. Although he
found the record ambiguous, he argued that it clearly showed that Con-
gress intended "Title IX to mirror... Title VI" of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.64 Title VI prohibits race discrimination in federally funded pro-
grams and activities and contains the same program-specific language
and activities... benefit from federal financial assistance." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in
part).
63. Id. at 1226 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
64. Id. at 1228 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Title IX began as a floor amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1971, S. 659, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 30,155 (1971). The amendment, proposed by Senator Bayh,
included enforcement provisions identical to those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982) and 117 CONG. REc. 30,157 (1971). The coverage provision,
however, differed from that of Title VI. Senator Bayh's amendment provided, in pertinent
part, that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under any program
or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school or
department of graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance
117 CONG. REc. 30,156 (1971).
The record reveals no explanation of the coverage provision or of whether it was intended
to have a scope similar to that of Title VI. The amendment was ruled non-germane on August
6, 1971. Id. at 30,415.
Representative Edith Green included provisions prohibiting sex discrimination in H.R.
7248, the House version of the Higher Education Act of 1971. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 39,098-99 (1971). Those provisions were closely patterned after Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982). Representative
Green's bill prohibited sex discrimination in "any educational program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 39,098 (1971).
Senator Bayh incorporated the language of Representative Green's coverage and termina-
tion provisions when he introduced a modified version of his original amendment to S. 659 in
1972. 118 CONG. REC. 5802 (1972). Again, Senator Bayh characterized the enforcement
provisions of his amendment as "parallel to those found in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act." Id. at 5803.
On its face, Senator Bayh's modified amendment called for a narrower scope of coverage
than did his original measure. The original language prohibits discrimination in institutions
which receive federal aid for "any program or activity." Amendment 398 to the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1971, S. 659, § 601, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 30,155, 30,156 (1971).
The 1972 amendment tracks the language of Representative Green's bill, prohibiting discrimi-
nation in "program[s] or activit[ies]" receiving aid. Amendment 874 to the Higher Education
Act of 1972, S. 659, § 1001(a), 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rac. 5802, 5803 (1972).
Courts and commentators have made much of the apparent difference in the two versions. See,
e.g., Comment, HEW's Regulations Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 144; Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Common-
wealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aft'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982); Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418, 426 (6th
Cir. 1982). All agree, however, that the lack of explanation for the change only heightens the
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found in Title IX.65 Justice Brennan therefore looked to the legislative
history of Title VI for an understanding of the statutory term.6 6
Although no precise understanding of the meaning of the program-
specific language emerged from the record, congressional debate on the
issue suggests the purpose that the language was intended to serve.67
Great controversy surrounded the application of Title VI's fund termina-
tion sanction 68 to states reluctant to end racial discrimination in public
schools. 69 Southern senators were concerned that noncompliance in one
school district would result in termination of federal funds to an entire
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the program-specific language in the legislative history,
Id.
The following colloquy between Representatives Green, Waggonner and Steiger only ag-
gravates the problem:
Mr. WAGGONNER. Let me clarify a little bit better the point I am trying to
make and that is this: This applies, apparently, only to those programs wherein the
Federal Government is in part or in whole financing a program or an activity?
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. It is really the same as the Civil Rights Act in terms
of race.
Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin.... In title IX [Mr. Waggonner] asked relating to
a program on [sic] activities receiving Federal financial assistance, and under the
"program on [sic] activity" one could not discriminate. That is not to be read, am I
correct, that it is limited in terms of its application, that is, title [IX], to only pro-
grams that are federally financed? For example, are we saying that if in the English
department they receive no funds from the Federal Government that therefore that
program is exempt?
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. If the gentleman will yield, the answer is in the af-
firmative. Enforcement is limited to each entity or institution and to each program
and activity. Discrimination would cut off all program funds within an institution,
Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. So that the effect of title [IX] is to, in effect, go
across the board in terms of the cutting off of funds to an institution that would
discriminate, is that correct?
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. The purpose of title [IX] is to end discrimination in
all institutions of higher education, yes, across the board ....
117 CONG. Rnc. 39,256 (1971).
Thus, as this excerpt illustrates, Title X's legislative history provides little help in deter-
mining the precise scope of the statute.
65. See supra note 2. Title VI provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
66. As Justice Brennan pointed out, "the voluminous legislative history of Title VI is not
easy to comprehend." Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1228 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
For every statement equating the word "program" with a specific federal grant statute, another
gives it a more expansive meaning. Id. at 1228, 1229, nn.5 & 6 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part).
67. See Note, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title
Vi's Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1113, 1118, 1119-20 (1970).
68. Section 602 of Title VI provides that federal financial assistance can be terminated for
failure to comply with Title VI. 20 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982).
69. See Note, supra note 67, at 1118, 1119-20.
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state school system, or that discrimination in an education program
would result in an end to federal assistance to unrelated programs such
as highways.70 Justice Brennan concluded that the program-specific lan-
guage was included to allay these concerns.71 Since Title IX, unlike Title
VI, is limited by its terms to education aid, these concerns did not arise
under Title IX. Thus, the legislative history of Title VI provided little
guidance as to the meaning of Title IX's program-specific language.
Justice Brennan next examined Congress' understanding of judicial
and administrative interpretations of Title VI at the time it enacted Title
IX. 2 Administrative regulations adopted in compliance with Title VI
70. One commentator has remarked, "[t]he constant maneuvering and persuasion required
to secure supporting votes often precluded any single congressional understanding of the pur-
pose of many provisions of the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964]." Note, supra note 67, at 1117 &
n.17.
The program-specific language of Title VI originated in Senate amendments to the House
bill. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The amendments resulted from an informal
bipartisan conference and were accepted without change by the House. Note, supra note 67, at
1117 (citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACr OF 1964 at 289
(1964)). Thus, no committee reports on the changes were produced. IM.
Although the program-specific language was clearly intended to limit Title VI to prevent
wholesale fund cutoffs to an entire state, id at 1118, no clear explanation of the scope of the
provision emerges from the record. According to Senator Humphrey, "[w]e have made no
changes of substance in Title VI, which is concerned with discrimination in programs that
receive financial assistance from the Federal Government. We have made several minor ad-
justments and, in addition, we have modified the language to make explicit the declared inten-
tion of this title." 110 CONG. REC. 12,714 (1964).
The Senate debates surrounding the program-specific language of Title VI indicate that
the primary concern was to place geographical and subject matter limits on fund termination.
In response to southern senators fearing fund cutoffs to entire states, Senator Humphrey re-
marked that, "[T]itle [VI] is designed to limit any termination of Federal assistance to the
particular offenders in the particular area where the unlawful discrimination occurs." Id.
During debates on Title VI which gave rise to the program-specific amendments, Senator
Ribicoff stated that, "if there were 100 school districts and discrimination was found in 1
school district, the funds would be cut off for only that one school district, but not the funds
for the other 99." 110 CONG. REc. (1964). Senator Pastore illustrated the subject matter
limits on termination as follows:
Let us assume that we are considering aid to dependent children. We could not cut
off funds for the building of a road because that is another program, although it is a
Federal grant. The action must be confined to the specific program in which discrim-
ination exists, and then only within the particular jurisdiction where the discrimina-
tion takes place.
Although these debates took place before the introduction of the program-specific amend-
ment, the changes were intended to clarify the scope of Title VI, as articulated during these
discussions, rather than to alter it. Id at 12,714. Thus, they furnish reliable indications of the
meaning of the limiting language.
71. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
72. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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took a broad view of coverage.73 Justice Brennan argued that Congress
must have been aware that the same approach would be taken under
Title IX.74 He reasoned that "nothing in the legislative history suggests
otherwise, and '[it] is always appropriate to assume that our elected rep-
resentatives, like other citizens, know the law.' ,,7 Justice Brennan ar-
gued that a review of case law indicated that Congress understood the
program-specific language of Title VI to be consistent with broad cover-
age.76 Although he also concluded that no court has construed section
601(a) of Title VI narrowly, in fact, no court has reached the issue.7
Next, noting that members of Congress repeatedly discussed Title
VI and its provisions during debates on Title IX, Justice Brennan con-
tended that "'[courts] are especially justified in presuming both that
those representatives were aware of the prior interpretation of Title VI
and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title
IX." ,,78
Finally, Justice Brennan focused on the "unique post-enactment his-
tory" of Title IX to show that Congress approved of administrative regu-
lations adopting an expansive interpretation of section 901(a). 79  The
Court had twice before "recognized the probative value of Title IX's
unique post-enactment history" and did so again in Grove City College.80
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,8 the Court found that a persistent
assumption among judges and administrative officials that Title IX cre-
ated a private right of action, coupled with Congress' failure to change
that assumption through legislation, provided evidence that Congress in-
tended the remedy.82
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,8 3 the Court relied on
Congress' failure to disapprove agency regulations prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination to support its holding that section 901(a) authorized
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d) (1972).
74. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1230 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
75. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979)).
76. Id. at 1230-31 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
77. Id. at 1231 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Justice Brennan relied on Board of
Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). Finch, however, construed the
fund termination provision of Title VI, not the anti-discrimination provision. See infra notes
114-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Finch.
78. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1231 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (quoting Can-
non, 441 U.S. 677, 697-98 (1979)).
79. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
80. See id at 1219.
81. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
82. Id at 702-03.
83. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
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the prohibition.14 The Court noted that" [w]here 'an agency's statutory
construction has been fully brought to the attention of the public and the
Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation
although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably
the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.' "85
The Department of Education proposed and adopted regulations
implementing Title IX that included the same broad view of coverage
found in Title VI regulations.8 6 The regulations prohibited sex discrimi-
nation "under any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational
training, or other education program or activity operated by a recipient
which receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.""7 They also
provided that an institution would become a recipient of federal financial
assistance if it or any of its students received federal funds directly or
through a student.88
Pursuant to section 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions
Act,89 Congress explicitly reviewed the regulations to see that they were
consistent with the statute from which they derived their authority.90
Resolutions proposed in the Senate to invalidate the regulations 9' chal-
lenged the extension of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics and extracur-
ricular activities,92 which rarely receive direct federal aid. Nevertheless,
according to Justice Brennan, Congress has consistently refused to invali-
date Department regulation of college athletic programs.93
Moreover, Congress has not hesitated to amend Title IX when it
84. Id. at 535.
85. Id. at 535 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 & n.10 (1979)).
86. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
87. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (1983).
88. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1983).
89. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567 (1964).
90. According to § 431(d)(1), new regulations become effective 45 days after submission to
both houses of Congress, unless Congress disapproves the rule by concurrent resolution. Id.
The Supreme Court declared this type of legislative veto an unconstitutional violation of sepa-
ration of powers in Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
91. S. Con. Res. 46, and S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
92. All attempts to amend Title IX to expressly exclude coverage of intercollegiate athlet-
ics have failed. Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 524 F. Supp.
531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). The issue of sexual equality in
intercollegiate sports has generated great controversy. See, e.g., Gaal & DeLorenzo, The Le-
gality and Requirements of HEW's Proposed "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 6 J. COLL. AND UNIV. L. 161 (1979); Kuhn, Title IX. Employment and
Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49 (1976); Martin, Title IX and Inter-
collegiate Athletics: Scoring Points for Women, 8 OH. NoRTH. UNIV. L. REV. 481 (1981);
Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: HEW Gets Serious About Equality in Sports?, 15
N. ENG. L. Rlv. 573 (1979).
93. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1232 & n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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disagreed with agency interpretations. For example, in both 1974 and
1976, Congress excepted certain activities from Title IX coverage, in-
cluding social fraternities and sororities, dormitory arrangements, and
father/son, mother/daughter events.9 4 Justice Brennan contended that
the failure to exclude athletics demonstrates Congress' understanding
that Title IX coverage extends to activities not receiving direct federal
aid as long as some part of the institution does receive such aid.9"
In summary, Justice Brennan's opinion on the meaning of section
901(a)'s program-specific language paralleled the majority's analysis of
whether Grove City College received federal financial assistance. In
holding that student loans and grants made Grove City College a recipi-
ent of federal aid, the majority opinion carefully reviewed the legislative
histories of Title IX and the Pell grant statute, and analyzed the post-
enactment history of Title IX.96 Yet the Court summarily dismissed
contrary indications of Congressional intent and completely ignored Ti-
tle IX's post-enactment history when it held that only the financial aid
program must comply with section 901(a).97 Justice Brennan's thorough
treatment of these factors underscores the weaknesses of the majority's
reasoning on this issue.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(9) (1982).
95. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1234 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Justice Bren-
nan's thoroughly researched and well-argued analysis presents a formidable challenge to the
majority's interpretation of Title IX's coverage provisions. Justice Brennan attacked the ma-
jority's reasoning on several grounds. First, he argued that Congress was not only aware of
benefits to colleges and universities resulting from such programs as the Pell grant, but in-
tended to provide those benefits. Id at 1235 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Thus, Justice
Brennan argued, students' use of Pell grants made the entire institution the recipient of federal
aid not because it "frees up" other funds, but because Congress intended the grants to provide
aid to colleges as well as to students. .d. at 1236-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Second, Justice Brennan argued that the Court's declaration that "student financial aid
programs are ... suigeneris," id. at 1221, severely limits the effect of the holding. Id. at 1237
(Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Finally, Justice Brennan attributed the Court's ruling to its willingness to defer to policy
changes under the Reagan Department of Education. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Although the Department had argued consistently in the lower courts that student financial
aid would trigger institution-wide coverage, id at 1216 & n.10, it abandoned that position in
1983, claiming the court of appeals was incorrect in holding the entire College subject to Title
IX coverage. Id at 1237 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). The Court's facile treatment of the
legislative history and its failure to consider nearly 10 years of administrative history lend
credence to Justice Brennan's charge that the Court deferred to executive branch policy
changes.
96. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1216-20.
97. Id at 1220-22.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF GROVE CITY COLLEGE V. BELL
A. Narrowing the Scope of Section 901(a)
The Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell represents a seri-
ous setback in the federal government's effort to end discrimination.
Although the Court correctly ruled that Congress intended the statute to
apply to colleges receiving no federal aid other than loans and grants to
students,98 it severely limited the effect of this ruling. If only the finan-
cial aid program at Grove City College must comply with section 901(a),
the federal government is powerless to prevent discrimination in admis-
sions, course enrollments, student housing and, indeed, in any other area
of the institution.
Additionally, it makes little sense to speak of isolated "programs" in
the context of an institution of higher education. Although individual
departments each have their own internal administrative hierarchies, all
are responsible to the policy-making body of the institution as a whole.
A department within a college does not ordinarily function as a wholly
independent entity.99
The Grove City College interpretation of section 901(a)'s program-
specific language may completely undermine progress in many areas of
sex discrimination in programs which receive no direct federal aid. For
instance, in Haffer v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of
Higher Education,"c° decided two years before Grove City College, the
district court held that section 901(a)'s anti-discrimination provisions ap-
plied to the University's intercollegiate athletic department.' 1 Although
the University received over nineteen million dollars in federal grants
and contracts in addition to loans and interest subsidies for construction,
none of the aid went directly to the athletic program. 0 2 The court based
its holding on two grounds: (1) Congress intended section 901(a) to have
a broad scope and specifically approved its application to athletics,1
0 3
98. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1220 (1984).
99. See Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Harmonizing its Restric-
tive Language with its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043 (1983).
100. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 540.
102. Id. at 532.
103. Id. at 534. Although the court noted the ambiguity of Title IX's legislative history, it
relied on Congress' resistance to several attempts to amend the statute to exclude intercollegi-
ate athletics from coverage. Id at 534-35. In addition, the court noted the intense controversy
surrounding proposed Department regulations covering intercollegiate athletics. Id at 536.
During six days of hearings to determine whether the regulations complied with the law, cov-
erage of athletics emerged as the most hotly contested issue. Id at 536 & nn.9-10. Because of
the prominence of the debate and the intense scrutiny which the regulations underwent, the
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and (2) even if section 901(a) were narrowly interpreted to cover only
directly assisted programs, such direct assistance could be found in the
close connection between federal funds and athletics.
1°4
Under the Grove City College decision, 105 Temple University cannot
be sustained on the first ground. If the athletic department receives no
direct federal aid, it cannot be subject to Title IX's prohibition on sex
discrimination."°6 Moreover, the second ground supporting the Temple
University decision can be vigorously attacked under the Grove City Col-
lege reasoning. In writing for the majority in Grove City College, Justice
White expressly negated the proposition that because federal student aid
goes eventually to an institution's general operating budget, and thus
benefits all activities and programs, it triggers institution-wide cover-
age."0 7 He concluded that Congress did not intend the Department's
regulatory authority to reach beyond the particular program that directly
receives the assistance.108 Thus, according to Justice White, compliance
with section 901(a) is to be determined not by how federal funds are
spent, but by how they are tagged before disbursement to the institution.
In Temple University, for example, eighty percent of the wages of
more than fifty employees of the college athletic department were paid
through the federally funded College Work Study Program."0 9 Under
Justice White's reasoning in Grove City College, only the financial aid
department administering the Work Study Program must comply with
section 901(a) since the financial aid department is the only "program"
receiving federal financial assistance.
Thus, the decision in Grove City College leaves the federal govern-
ment unable to stop sex discrimination in athletic programs in federally
funded institutions of higher education. Similarly, institutions which re-
ceive federal building loans and grants would be free to discriminate in
admissions, education programs, athletics-in short, in everything but
court felt justified in relying on Congress' approval of the regulations as reflecting its intent
that Title IX covered intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 536.
104. Id at 540. The court found that athletic program employees received wages through
the federally funded College Work Study Program, 42 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982), that intercollegi-
ate athletes received hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal financial aid and that the
athletic program used buildings financed by federal funds. Id. The court concluded that this
established enough connection between the intercollegiate athletic program and federal funds
going to Temple University to warrant Title IX coverage of athletics. Id.
105. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
106. See id at 1221-22.
107. Id at 1222.
108. Id.
109. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. at 540.
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the administration of their building funds. Such results cannot be toler-
ated in a nation committed to equality of opportunity for all citizens.
B. Extending the Grove City College Construction of Section 901(a)
to the Fund Termination Provisions of Section 902
Although the Court in Grove City College v. Bell did not reach the
issue of the proper construction of section 902 of Title IX, 1 1 that section,
which provides for administrative enforcement of section 901(a), also
contains program-specific language."' Thus, it is likely that courts and
agencies will apply the same narrow interpretation supplied by the Grove
City College decision to section 902 enforcement powers.
Section 902 provides that:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this sec-
tion may be effected . . . by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity
to any recipient ... but such termination or refusal shall be
limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
other recipient as to whom.., a finding [of noncompliance] has
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular
program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has
been so found .... 12
1. Current interpretations of section 902's fund termination provision
a. Board of Public Instruction v. Finch
Section 902 of Title IX is identical to section 602 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,113 which makes fund termination available to
enforce prohibitions against race discrimination in federally funded pro-
grams or activities. 1 4 Although no court has addressed the scope of the
fund termination power of Title IX, the Fifth Circuit construed Title
VI's fund termination provision in Board of Public Instruction v.
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
111. Id
112. Id.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
114. Section 602 of Title VI provides that:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
... by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient ... but such termination or refusal shall be
limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to
whom ... a finding [of noncompliance] has been made and, shall be limited in its
effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has
been so found ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
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Finch. 15
In 1964 the public school system in Taylor County, Florida was al-
most completely segregated on the basis of race.116 Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in feder-
ally funded programs or activities.'17 The Taylor County School Board
received federal assistance under three different grant statutes." 8
After several years of unsuccessful attempts to achieve voluntary
compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department instituted
administrative proceedings to terminate all federal funds received by the
School Board." 9 The Department's hearing examiner entered an order
terminating funds after finding that "progress toward student desegrega-
tion was inadequate."1 20  Under the review provisions of the relevant
grant statutes, the Board appealed directly to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, claiming that the Department had failed to make findings of
discrimination under each of the School Board's federal grant
programs.
2 1
On appeal the Department first contended that the word "program"
in section 602 meant an entire school program rather than a particular
federal grant program. 12 2 Second, it argued that the court must reject
the School Board's argument on appeal because the Board did not raise it
at the administrative proceedings.'
23
The Fifth Circuit held that the program-specific language of section
602 required the Department to make findings of discrimination in each
federal grant program in which the School Board participated. 124 The
court reasoned that the case presented an exception to the general rule
115. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
116. Id. at 1070.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
118. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1071. The Board received a total of $203,657.55 in aid for educa-
tion of low income families, Title II, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C. §§ 241a-241m (Supp. 1969), grants for supplementary education centers, Title III, Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (Supp. 1969), and for
adult education, Basic Education for Adults, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213 (Supp. 1969).
119. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1070-71. Until 1965, the school district was completely segregated
by race. The Board responded to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adopting a
"freedom of choice" plan. Id. at 1070. Although the Commissioner of Education approved
the plan and the Board formally complied with Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) requirements, by 1967 HEW believed the pace of desegregation in Taylor County was
unacceptable. Id
120. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1071.
121. Id. at 1071-72.
122. Id at 1076.
123. Id. at 1072.
124. Id. at 1079.
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governing judicial review of agency adjudications. 25 Ordinarily a court
"'usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the administrative de-
termination upon a ground not theretofore presented.' "126 The Fifth
Circuit concluded, however, that because the Department made its deter-
mination in "excess of statutory authority,"127 preventing the court from
evaluating possible prejudice to Taylor County, it could not affirm the
agency's order. 28 The court reasoned that the Board's segregation of
faculty and students did not automatically render all programs in Taylor
County schools defective.1 9
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the word "program" in section
602 of Title VI to mean "particular grant statute" is questionable.1 30 As
noted above,13 1 the program-specific language of Title VI is better ex-
plained in terms of Congressional concern that discrimination in public
schools would lead to cutoffs of federal aid unrelated to education. The
Finch decision, with its emphasis on the scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative fact finding, may have been motivated by a desire to exercise
more control over agency adjudication. Thus, the court may have looked
for a statutory construction that would require the Department to make
more specific findings.
In fact, the court's construction of section 602 probably did not af-
fect the outcome of the case. The court noted that "if the funds provided
by the grant are administered in a discriminatory manner, or if they sup-
port a program which is infected by a discriminatory environment, then
termination of such funds is proper."' 132 The Department only had to
make findings on the record that the School Board's federal grants sup-
ported programs infected by a discriminatory environment. Given that
Taylor County schools were entirely segregated, such a finding was
reasonable.
b. application of Finch to Title IX's fund termination provision
The Department focused on dicta in Board of Public Instruction v.
Finch to support a broad construction of Title IX's fund termination pro-
vision in the preamble to its Title IX regulations.
125. Id. at 1073.
126. Id. at 1072 (quoting Unemployment Compensation Com'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143,
154 (1946)).
127. I at 1073.
128. I at 1074.
129. Id.
130. See Note, supra note 67.
131. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
132. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1074 (emphasis added).
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The preamble states that:
[T]he interpretation of the [fund termination] provision in Title
IX will be consistent with the interpretation of similar language
contained in Title VI .... [T]he only case specifically ruling on
the language contained in Title VI... holds that Federal funds
may be terminated under Title VI upon a finding that they "are
[sic] infected by a discriminatory environment."' 133
The preamble misstates the Finch holding. Finch requires that the
agency make findings of fact to determine whether discrimination oc-
curred in each "program" funded by federal grants. 134 A situation in
which the funds "support a program... infected by a discriminatory
environment" satisfies the requirement.135 Thus, before Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, the scope of the fund termination power in section 902 of
Title IX turned on the meaning of the phrase "infected by a discrimina-
tory environment."
2. The effect of Grove City College on Finch
A broad interpretation would find "infection" of federally funded
programs whenever a connection existed between those programs and
discrimination in another part of the institution receiving the assistance.
For example, in Haffer v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of
Higher Education,'36 the district court concluded that because employees
paid through the College Work Study Program worked for the Univer-
sity's intercollegiate athletic department, the athetic department must
comply with section 901(a).137 Under a broad interpretation of the infec-
tion concept, College Work Study funds could then be terminated to en-
force compliance with section 901(a).
A narrow interpretation of "infection" would confine termination to
assistance which directly funded the discriminatory program. Under this
view, for example, because Temple University's athletic program did not
133. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (citing Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068,
1078 (5th Cir. 1969)). The fund termination provision of Title IX is mentioned only in the
preamble to the Department's Title IX regulations. The preamble states that, consistent with
the interpretation of Title VI's fund termination provision, aid received by an education recipi-
ent will be subject to termination "if it receives or benefits from such assistance." Id. Beyond
this, no other regulation addresses fund termination. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106 to 106.71 (1984).
134. Finch, 414 F.2d 1079.
135. !L at 1078.
136. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
137. Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 540
(E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
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receive federal aid intended expressly to benefit athletics, no federal aid
could be terminated on the basis of discrimination in athletics.
The decision in Grove City College narrowing the scope of section
901(a) makesit highly unlikely that a court would adopt a broad inter-
pretation of section 902 fund termination powers. As noted earlier,
under the Grove City College construction of section 901(a) the Depart-
ment could not require Temple University to end sex discrimination in
athletics, even though the University received many types of federal fi-
nancial assistance. It would make no sense to construe section 902 to
allow termination of funds not directly intended to support athletics, no
matter how "infected" the funded programs might be. The Grove City
College decision, then, will have the effect of limiting the scope of both
section 901(a) and section 902.
V. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO GROVE CITY COLLEGE V. BELL
Congress reacted swiftly to the Grove City decision.138 On April 12,
1984, less than two months after the decision came down, Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy introduced S. 2568, "a bill to clarify the application of
Title IX."139
Senator Kennedy's bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1984, would have
enlarged the scope of section 901(a)'s anti-discrimination provisions."
138. The Civil Rights Act of 1984, supra note 7, was introduced on April 12, 1984 and
represented the most comprehensive legislative response to the issues raised in Grove City Col-
lege. The bill would have amended not only Title IX, but also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.
130 CONG. REc. S4586 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984). The Senate sponsors of the bill believed that
because the language interpreted in Grove City College was similar to the language of the other
civil rights statutes, a clarification amendment was necessary for each. Id.
139. 130 CONG. Rac. S4585.
On February 28, 1984, the day Grove City College was decided, Senator Packwood intro-
duced the Sex Discrimination in Education Reform Act of 1984. S. 2363, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
130 CONG. Rc. S1890, S1894 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1984). This bill would have replaced the
words "education program or activity" with the words "education program, activity or institu-
tion" in section 901(a) of Title IX. Id. at S1894.
That same day, Representative Schneider proposed a bill in the House "to clarify the
intent of Congress in adopting title IX ... to prohibit any educational institution which re-
ceives any Federal assistance, direct or indirect, from discriminating on the basis of sex." H.R.
5011, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1096 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
Neither bill was reported out of committee.
140. Section 901(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 provided in pertinent part, that, "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation, be denied
benefits, or be subjected to discrimination by any education recipient of Federal financial
assistance." H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984).
Section 902 defined "recipient" as:
(A) any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State
or political subdivision thereof, or any public or private agency, institution, or organ-
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It nevertheless would have retained the requirement of a nexus between
funds terminated under section 902 and discrimination found. 141 Thus,
the proposed language would have given the executive branch broad
powers to regulate and investigate an entire institution if any of its
subunits received federal financial assistance. The power to terminate
funding upon a finding of discrimination, however, would have been lim-
ited to "the particular assistance which supports such
noncompliance." 14 2
The bill's fund termination language could, on its face, support a
broad interpretation, but the legislative history indicates that its drafters
intended to make enforcement powers under section 902 more narrow
than the coverage provisions of section 901(a).1 43 Thus, the amendment,
if enacted, would have created a disparity between the scope of section
901(a) and the fund termination powers in section 902.144 It would have
enabled the Department of Education to require all parts of an institu-
ization, or other entity (including any subunit of any such State, subdivision, instru-
mentality, agency, institution, organization, or entity)...
... to which Federal financial assistanc is extended (directly or through an-
other entity or a person), or which receives support from the extension of Federal
financial assistance to any of its subunits.
Ide at 40-41.
Under proposed section 902, fund termination "shall be limited to the particular political
entity or part thereof, or other recipient as to which [a finding of noncompliance] has been
made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular assistance which supports such non-
compliance." Id.
By substituting the word "recipient" for the words "program or activity" in section
901(a), the bill would have made clear that Title IX coverage extends to an entire institution if
any of its subunits receives federal aid. The new language would have shifted the focus of the
anti-discrimination provision from the level of direct aid to a program to that of an institution
or entity which actually receives direct or indirect support from federal funding.
The bill also would have eliminated the words "program or activity" from the fund termi-
nation provision, but would have retained the concept of limiting cutoffs. Id. The new lan-
guage would have limited fund termination to the "particular assistance which supports the
noncompliance." Id
141. See supra note 140.
142. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1984).
143. Id. at 33.
144. On its face, the fund termination provision provided in the bill was much narrower
than the coverage provision. The termination provision seemed to embody two distinct limita-
tions. The first part of the sentence, limiting termination to the "particular political entity, or
part thereof, or other recipient" found to be in noncompliance, seemed to address geographical
limitations. Presumably, it would have prevented a cutoff of funding to an entire state school
system after a finding of discrimination in one district. This language was not substantively
different from that of the original Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
The second part of the sentence would have limited the effects of the fund termination. It
can be read to mean that within the political entity found to be in noncompliance, the assist-
ance to be cut off is that which "supports the noncompliance so found." 130 CONG. REC.
S4588 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984). Although the word "supports" is susceptible to a broader
Nov. 1985] GROVE CITY COLLEGE v. BELL
tion to comply with section 901(a) if any part received federal financial
assistance, but the Department could terminate funds to enforce section
901(a) only if that money were intended to directly benefit the program
in which discrimination occurred. If no assistance went directly to that
program, no funds could be terminated.
The Civil Rights Act of 1984 passed the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly, 45 but it failed to pass the Senate despite having sixty-
three co-sponsors there.1 4 6 Republican senators were concerned that the
interpretation than that given to the original program-specific language, one would be straining
to accord it the same breadth as the coverage provision in section 901(a).
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 indicates that Congress did not
intend to alter the fund termination provision. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33
(1984). The bill retains the requirement that a nexus be established between the discrimination
and any federal funding to be terminated. Id Pinpointing would apply to termination only.
Id. According to the report of the House Committee on Labor and Education, the concept of
"support" is consistent with that found in Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068
(5th Cir. 1969). The language deletes "program or activity" in the enforcement as well as
coverage sections to avoid inconsistency. Congress intended to retain current enforcement
procedures as practiced by the Department of Education. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1984).
145. 130 CONG. REc. H7057 (daily ed. June 26, 1984).
146. The Republican leadership in the Senate never scheduled a vote on the measure. 130
CONG. REc. S12,143 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
In the final days of the session, Senator Byrd introduced a modified version of the bill as
an amendment to the fiscal 1985 spending bill, H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), in
an effort to force Senate Republicans to vote on civil rights just before adjourning to campaign
for the November 1984 elections.
The amendment dropped the definition of "recipient" contained in S. 2568 § 2(a) and
substituted a clause providing that the term should be construed according to agency regula-
tions in effect prior to the Grove City College v. Bell decision. 130 CONG. REc. 12,144 (daily
ed. Sept. 27, 1984). According to Senator Packwood, the purpose of the change was "to re-
move all doubt that the bill will result in an expansion of civil rights jurisdiction." Id Since
the agency definition of "recipient," 34 C.F.R. 106 (1984), was the same as that in S. 2568
§ 2(a), however, the amendment represented no substantive difference from the original bill.
Senator Byrd's substitute retained the narrow fund termination provision of S. 2568
§ 2(b)(2)(A). 130 CONG. REC. S12,144 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984). According to Senator
Packwood, "discrimination in the English department at a college would not require termina-
tion of all Federal funds received by the college simply because [the] funds... may have freed
up other college funds to be used in the English department." Id.
Senator Byrd's amendment survived a ruling that it was not germane to the spending bill
by a vote of 51-48. Id. at S12,166-67. Immediately following the vote, Senator Hatch, a major
opponent of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 and chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, introduced three controversial amendments of his own in an attempt to
beat Senator Byrd at his own game. Senator Hatch tacked onto Senator Byrd's measure an
amendment granting tuition tax credits to parents of children attending private schools, an
anti-gun control provision and a measure prohibiting the use of busing to achieve school deseg-
regation. Id at S12,167. Senator Hatch apparently sought to force Senate Democrats to vote
on these controversial conservative issues if the Democrats wanted to force a vote on civil
rights.
Pressed for time as the federal government threatened to grind to a halt for lack of money,
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bill would expand civil rights jurisdiction if courts construed the pro-
posed changes too broadly.147 The bill would have amended not only
Title IX, but Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14" section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,149 and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975.150 All of these laws contain similar language prohibiting discrimi-
nation in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.
151
Special language was included in the proposed amendments to Title
VI and section 504 to exclude from coverage the "ultimate beneficiary"
of such assistance as Social Security benefits or food stamps.152 Senator
Hatch, one of the chief conservative opponents of the Civil Rights Act of
1984, nevertheless insisted that the bill would result in Title VI coverage
of grocery stores accepting food stamps, drug stores filling Medicaid pre-
scriptions and the like.153 Thus, at the close of the session, the Ninety-
eighth Congress failed to agree on legislation overturning Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell.
Senate majority leader Robert Dole, an early sponsor of the Civil
Rights Act of 1984 who later withdrew his support, introduced a com-
promise bill, S. 272, in the early days of the Ninety-ninth Congress.
15 4
The compromise bill, titled the Civil Rights Amendment Act of
1985, "would amend all four laws to make clear that where Federal fi-
nancial assistance is extended to any educational program or activity of
an education institution, the institution itself is to be considered the cov-
ered program.""'5 The Dole bill also provides that in cases "not involv-
ing education institutions, the meaning of the phrase program or activity
remains the same and should be construed without consider[ing]... the
Grove City decision . ... "156
Two weeks later, Senator Kennedy introduced S. 431, the Civil
and wishing to avoid controversy and commence election campaigns, the Senate tabled Senator
Byrd's civil rights amendment on October 2, 1984 by a vote of 53-45. 130 CONG. REc.
S12,642 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984).
147. 130 CONG. REc. S12,144 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982).
149. 20 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1982).
The Senate sponsors believed that because courts might apply the Grove City College con-
struction to each civil rights law, each should be clarified. 130 CONG. REc. S4586 (daily ed.
Apr. 12, 1984).
152. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1984).
153. See 130 CONG. RPc. S12,149-50 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1984) (selected illustrations of the
impact of the bill offered by Sen. Hatch).
154. 131 CONG. Rc. S636 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id. at S637.
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Rights Restoration Act of 1985.157 Senator Kennedy's proposed amend-
ment would define the words "program or activity" in all four civil rights
laws "to make clear that discrimination is prohibited throughout entire
agencies or institutions if any part receives federal financial assist-
ance."' 58 The Kennedy bill would not limit the new definition of "pro-
gram or activity" to education programs only, as would the Dole bill.
Further, the Kennedy bill would replace the words "program or activ-
ity" in the fund termination provision with the language "assistance
which supports the noncompliance," although this change is not in-
tended to alter current interpretations of section 902.159 The Dole bill
makes no express reference to termination powers.
VI. ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TITLE IX
A. Ineffectiveness of Legislation Proposed to Date
Title IX must be amended to accomplish two purposes: (1) to over-
turn the Grove City College v. Bell decision narrowing the scope of sec-
tion 901(a)'s anti-discrimination provisions, and (2) to clarify the scope
of the fund termination power accorded in section 902.
Both of the pending bills achieve the first goal. Each would make
clear that an entire college must comply with section 901(a) if any part of
the college receives federal financial assistance. Each recognizes that to
regard programs or departments within an integrated educational institu-
tion as isolated entities seriously hampers efforts to end discrimination." 6°
Congress has failed to recognize, however, the relationship between
section 901(a) and 902 and the impact of the Grove City College decision
and the proposed amendments on section 902 fund termination powers.
First, the existence of program-specific language in both sections leaves
open the possibility that courts will apply the Grove City College reason-
ing in construing section 902. Congress seems not to have considered
this likelihood. Each of the bills is intended only to change the scope of
section 901(a), leaving the substance of section 902 unchanged. 61 Be-
cause no court has yet construed the program-specific language of section
902, Congress in effect proposes to retain an ambiguity. A court subse-
quently interpreting section 902 may infer that even though Congress
157. 131 CONG. REC. S1303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985).
158. Id. at S1302.
159. See, eg., S. 431 § 3(b), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S1303 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1985).
160. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
161. See, eg., 131 CONG. REc. S1303 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy
concerning enforcement powers under S. 431).
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intended to overturn Grove City College, it intended only to disavow the
narrow construction as it applies to section 901(a).
Second, it makes little sense to require that an entire institution
comply with section 901(a) and then to limit section 902 fund termina-
tion to assistance that directly benefits the discriminatory program.
162
The result in many cases will be to deprive the Department of an effective
means of enforcing compliance with Title IX. Yet both bills retain pro-
gram-specific limitations on the scope of the fund termination provision.
The scope of section 902 fund termination powers must be co-exten-
sive with the proposed broad scope of section 901(a)'s prohibition on sex
discrimination. The proposed bills do not go far enough in simply mak-
ing an entire institution subject to section 901(a) if any part receives fed-
eral financial assistance. The Department must also be able to terminate
any federal assistance received by the institution if discrimination occurs
in any part of it.
A more narrow fund termination provision, even if coupled with
institution-wide coverage under section 901(a), would cripple the effec-
tiveness of Title IX for several reasons. First, there are indications that
the Department of Education will not investigate discrimination com-
plaints if it believes that fund termination is unavailable as an enforce-
ment tool.63 It would be inefficient to expend time and limited agency
resources to pursue a claim which, even if true, the agency could not
enforce.
Second, although the Department rarely cuts off funding because of
noncompliance, the threat of termination gives the Department the lever-
age to negotiate effective remedial measures with noncompliant enti-
ties."6 Limiting termination powers may substantially reduce a
recipient's incentive to bring its programs into compliance.
Finally, the possibility exists that retention of the limiting language
in the fund termination provision may influence courts to limit the other
means of enforcement available under Title IX.165 Title IX can be en-
forced by injunction166 and by a private right of action.1 67 The Justice
Department has contended that the Supreme Court in North Haven
162. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
163. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
164. 130 CONG. REc. 84587 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1682(2) (1982). "Compliance... may be effected... by any other means
authorized by law." Id.
166. 130 CONG. REc. 54587 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984). A funding agency may refer discrim-
ination cases to the Justice Department, which may seek injunctive relief against the offending
entity. Id.
167. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
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Board of Education v. Bell 6 construed the program-specific language to
limit all enforcement practices.169 Since the proposed bills would retain
limitations on fund termination, by analogy, the limit may be held to
apply to all enforcement practices.
Yet the fund termination provision must not be so broad as to per-
mit wholesale fund cutoffs not reasonably related to the discrimination
found. Title IX would be rendered nugatory if the Department could not
terminate a library grant upon a finding of discrimination in a college
athletic program. However, if the college were part of a statewide system
of campuses, a termination of funds to the entire system would seem
unfair and excessive.
Additionally, colleges and universities are not the only entities that
receive federal education aid. Federal aid may go directly to states, cit-
ies, or state and local government agencies. The fund termination provi-
sion must be drafted to prevent termination of education aid to an entire
state based on discrimination in one public school district.
The drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 attempted to balance
these competing concerns, but only with respect to section 901(a)'s pro-
hibition on discrimination. They sought to define the term "recipient of
Federal financial assistance" to differentiate between appropriate and in-
appropriate applications of section 901(a). They wanted to limit federal
intrusion into the affairs of states and private organizations that receive
federal financial assistance.
170
One way to balance these competing concerns would be to include a
precise definition of the term "recipient of Federal financial assistance"
in the statute. The definition should be drafted to clearly differentiate
between appropriate and inappropriate applications of sections 901(a)
and 902.
The drafters of the unsuccessful Civil Rights Act of 1984 took this
approach, 171 but only with respect to section 901(a)'s prohibition on dis-
crimination. Section 901(a) of the bill would have prohibited sex dis-
crimination "by any education recipient of Federal financial
168. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
169. 130 CONG. RaC. S8040 (daily ed. June 21, 1984) (opinion of Justice Department on
impact of Title IX amendments). The Court's holding in North Haven provides no support for
this contention. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 538. The Court held only that "an agency's author-
ity under Title IX to both promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the
program-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902." Id. (citation omitted). The case makes no
reference to the "other means" of enforcement provided for in section 902 of Title IX.
170. 130 CONG. REC. S4586 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
171. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
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assistance." '172 It defined recipient as:
Any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumental-
ity of a State or political subdivision thereof, or any public or
private agency, institution, or organization or other entity (in-
cluding any subunit of any such State, subdivision, instrumen-
tality, agency, institution, organization or entity),.., to which
Federal financial assistance is extended (directly or through an-
other entity or a person) or which receives support from the
extension of Federal financial assistance to any of its
subunits. 
173
The drafters intended aid to a subunit to trigger coverage of a parent
entity only if that aid benefits or supports the parent.1 74 Examples given
in the Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor17 1 indi-
cate clearly that "support" meant direct financial support.1
7 6
For example, a state receiving education block grants which it dis-
burses to school districts as it chooses would not be subject to section
901(a) coverage, except in the distribution of the funds, unless the state
agency administering the funds received direct financial benefit.' 77 The
type of benefit contemplated would exist only if the agency retained some
172. S. 2568, § 2(a)(3), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S4588 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1984).
173. S. 2586, § 2(b)(2)(A)-(B), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 54588 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 1984).
174. Id.
175. H.R. REP,. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984).
176. Id. at 26-27.
177. Id. at 26. The Committee explained the language as follows:
A recipient is covered in its entirety, including its subunits. Political subdivisions
(such as cities) are legal entities unto themselves and should not be treated as
subunits of their States. Thus, the receipt by a State of federal funds would not
necessarily lead to coverage of all political subdivisions, but it would lead to coverage
of all State agencies and departments. A political subdivision must itself receive
assistance in order to be covered. This may happen through the direct receipt of
federal funds, or through the receipt of federal funds from a State or other recipient,
but it is not the automatic result of a State's coverage.
Id.
The report includes several hypotheticals illustrating how the concept of support should
operate. For example, under the following fact situation, the university would not be covered
by Title IX:
A researcher in his or her individual capacity receives a National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) research grant of $1 million. The grant is distributed
through the university but it serves only as a conduit of the funds (no portion is
retained by the university for administrative purposes...).
... Under these provisions, the researcher is a recipient and must comply with
the antidiscrimination provisions.... [T]he university would not be covered.
Id. at 28.
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money for administrative expenses. 178 Even then, only the state agency,
not the entire state, would be subject to section 901(a). If the agency
disbursed all the funds to the school districts, discrimination in a district
could not subject the state agency or the state itself to section 901(a).
Although the attempt was laudable, the Civil Rights Act of 1984
suffered from two flaws, one of which proved fatal. First, the bill failed
to extend the broad scope of section 901(a) to section 902 enforcement
powers. Second, the bill's vague and confusing definition of recipient,
intended to cover every situation that might arise, ultimately stalled its
passage. Many senators found the language too imprecise to exclude in-
appropriate federal jurisdiction over civil rights. 179
A definition of "recipient" should differentiate simply and precisely
between the various entities affected when the government extends fed-
eral financial assistance for education. Once developed, such a definition
should apply equally to section 901(a) and section 902 to ensure that
funds can be terminated to the same extent that discrimination can be
prohibited.
B. A Proposal to Amend Title IX
Title IX should be amended to reflect these considerations. First,
section 901(a) should be amended to read: Recipients of federal aid for
education shall not exclude, deny benefits to, or discriminate in any way
against persons on the basis of sex.
Second, a section should be added defining recipient as:
Any entity which receives direct financial benefit from federal
financial education assistance extended
(a) to the entity itself,
(b) to those organizations the entity oversees;
or
(c) to the entity's parent organization.
Third, section 902 should be revised to read:
(a) Each federal department or agency authorized to extend
federal financial assistance for education, other than by contract
of insurance or guaranty, shall make rules implementing section
901(a) of this Title. These rules shall be consistent with the stat-
ute authorizing the financial assistance and shall apply generally
to recipients of such assistance. The President must approve all
rules before they become effective.
178. Id. at 26-27.
179. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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(b) Federal departments and agencies may enforce rules
adopted pursuant to section 902(a) in the following ways:
(1) By terminating or refusing to grant education assistance to
a noncompliant recipient after opportunity for hearing and after
an express finding on the record of the recipient's failure to
comply.
(A) Any termination or refusal to grant assistance shall be lim-
ited to assistance which benefits the recipient found to be
noncompliant.
(B) An order terminating or refusing to grant assistance shall
only take effect thirty days after the head of the department or
agency files a written report of the circumstances and grounds
for such action with the House and Senate Committees in charge
of the federal assistance involved.
(2) By any other means authorized by law, but only after notice
to the recipient and a determination that the recipient will not
comply voluntarily.
The proposed language seeks to simplify section 901(a) by eliminat-
ing program-specific language and making the provision easier to follow.
The proposed definition of "recipient" builds in the flexibility of the defi-
nition in the Civil Rights Act of 1984 but eliminates some of the confus-
ing terminology. For example, under the proposed language, the Temple
University athletic department18 ° would be a recipient because assistance
extended to its parent organization, Temple University, supported the
athletic department. On the other hand, a state education department
which disbursed all federal assistance to school districts would not be a
recipient because the agency receives no direct support from the aid.
The use of the word "recipient" in the fund termination provision
ensures that fund cutoffs will be co-extensive with the scope of section
901(a), but no broader. For example, the Department could terminate
Temple University's federal assistance if it supported a discriminatory
athletic department. However, noncompliance in a school district receiv-
ing federal assistance through the state could not result in termination of
all federal education aid to that state.
Other changes in the language of section 902 are intended only to
express existing provisions more clearly.
180. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In Grove City College v. Bell,18 ' the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
which prohibits sex discrimination 18 2 in federally funded programs and
activities. The Court first held that a college must comply with section
901(a) even if it received no aid other than federal loans and grants to
students.18 3  It also held, however, that only the particular program
within the College that received the federal assistance must comply.
184
Thus, because Grove City College received no federal assistance beyond
federal financial aid to students, only the College's financial aid depart-
ment must comply with section 901(a).
18 1
The Ninety-eighth Congress failed to pass the Civil Rights Act of
1984,186 which would have broadened the scope of section 901(a).
Although the bill would have overturned the Court's construction of sec-
tion 901(a) in Grove City College v. Bell, it would have left the scope of
section 902 fund termination powers vulnerable to a narrow
construction. 
87
Two bills introduced early in the Ninety-ninth Congress, S. 272188
and S. 431,189 suffer from the same problem. Both would overturn the
Court's narrow interpretation of section 901(a), but fail to address the
ambiguity left in section 902.190
Congress should reaffirm the federal government's commitment to
equal opportunity in education by enacting legislation that will both
overturn Grove City College and make clear that sections 901(a) and 902
are equal in scope. This Note proposes legislation that will enable federal
agencies to effectively enforce their anti-discrimination regulations and
prevent fund cutoffs unrelated to discriminatory practices.
Christie L. Morehead*
181. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
182. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
183. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1220.
184. Id. at 1222.
185. Id
186. See supra note 7.
187. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 154.
189. See supra note 157.
190. See supra note 164.
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